THE:SEC官員稱比特幣以太坊不是證券，提出6大判斷標準_ENT

DigitalAssetTransactions:WhenHoweyMetGary(Plastic)RemarksattheYahooFinanceAllMarketsSummit:CryptoThankyouAndy.Iampleasedtobeheretoday.Thiseventprovidesagreatopportunitytoaddressatopicthatisthesubjectofconsiderabledebateinthepressandinthecrypto-community–whetheradigitalassetofferedasasecuritycan,overtime,becomesomethingotherthanasecurity.Tostart,weshouldframethequestiondifferentlyandfocusnotonthedigitalassetitself,butonthecircumstancessurroundingthedigitalassetandthemannerinwhichitissold.Tothatend,abetterlineofinquiryis:“Canadigitalassetthatwasoriginallyofferedinasecuritiesofferingeverbelatersoldinamannerthatdoesnotconstituteanofferingofasecurity?”Incaseswherethedigitalassetrepresentsasetofrightsthatgivestheholderafinancialinterestinanenterprise,theanswerislikely“no.”Inthesecases,callingthetransactionaninitialcoinoffering,or“ICO,”orasaleofa“token,”willnottakeitoutofthepurviewoftheU.S.securitieslaws.Butwhataboutcaseswherethereisnolongeranycentralenterprisebeinginvestedinorwherethedigitalassetissoldonlytobeusedtopurchaseagoodorserviceavailablethroughthenetworkonwhichitwascreated?Ibelieveinthesecasestheanswerisaqualified“yes.”Iwouldliketosharemythinkingwithyoutodayaboutthecircumstancesunderwhichthatcouldoccur.BeforeIturntothesecuritieslawanalysis,letmesharewhatIbelievemaybemostexcitingaboutdistributedledgertechnology–thatis,thepotentialtoshareinformation,transfervalue,andrecordtransactionsinadecentralizeddigitalenvironment.Potentialapplicationsincludesupplychainmanagement,intellectualpropertyrightslicensing,stockownershiptransfersandcountlessothers.Thereisrealvalueincreatingapplicationsthatcanbeaccessedandexecutedelectronicallywithapublic,immutablerecordandwithouttheneedforatrustedthirdpartytoverifytransactions.Somepeoplebelievethatthistechnologywilltransforme-commerceasweknowit.Thereisexcitementandagreatdealofspeculativeinterestaroundthisnewtechnology.Unfortunately,therealsoarecasesoffraud.Inmanyregards,itisstill“earlydays.”ButIamnotheretodiscussthepromiseoftechnology–therearemanyinattendanceandspeakingheretodaythatcandoamuchbetterjobofthat.Iwouldliketofocusontheapplicationofthefederalsecuritieslawstodigitalassettransactions–thatishowtokensandcoinsarebeingissued,distributedandsold.Whileperhapsabitdryerthanthepromiseoftheblockchain,thistopiciscriticaltothebroaderacceptanceanduseofthesenovelinstruments.IwillbeginbydescribingwhatIoftensee.Promoters,inordertoraisemoneytodevelopnetworksonwhichdigitalassetswilloperate,oftensellthetokensorcoinsratherthansellshares,issuenotesorobtainbankfinancing.But,inmanycases,theeconomicsubstanceisthesameasaconventionalsecuritiesoffering.Fundsareraisedwiththeexpectationthatthepromoterswillbuildtheirsystemandinvestorscanearnareturnontheinstrument–usuallybysellingtheirtokensinthesecondarymarketoncethepromoterscreatesomethingofvaluewiththeproceedsandthevalueofthedigitalenterpriseincreases.Whenweseethatkindofeconomictransaction,itiseasytoapplytheSupremeCourt’s“investmentcontract”testfirstannouncedinSECv.Howey.Thattestrequiresaninvestmentofmoneyinacommonenterprisewithanexpectationofprofitderivedfromtheeffortsofothers.AnditisimportanttoreflectonthefactsofHowey.Ahoteloperatorsoldinterestsinacitrusgrovetoitsguestsandclaimeditwassellingrealestate,notsecurities.Whilethetransactionwasrecordedasarealestatesale,italsoincludedaservicecontracttocultivateandharvesttheoranges.Thepurchaserscouldhavearrangedtoservicethegrovethemselvesbut,infact,mostwerepassive,relyingontheeffortsofHowey-in-the-HillsService,Inc.forareturn.Inarticulatingthetestforaninvestmentcontract,theSupremeCourtstressed:“Formdisregardedforsubstanceandtheemphasisplaceduponeconomicreality.”Sothepurportedrealestatepurchasewasfoundtobeaninvestmentcontract–aninvestmentinorangegroveswasinthesecircumstancesaninvestmentinasecurity.JustasintheHoweycase,tokensandcoinsareoftentoutedasassetsthathaveauseintheirownright,coupledwithapromisethattheassetswillbecultivatedinawaythatwillcausethemtogrowinvalue,tobesoldlaterataprofit.And,asinHowey–whereinterestsinthegrovesweresoldtohotelguests,notfarmers–tokensandcoinstypicallyaresoldtoawideaudienceratherthantopersonswhoarelikelytousethemonthenetwork.IntheICOsIhaveseen,overwhelmingly,promoterstouttheirabilitytocreateaninnovativeapplicationofblockchaintechnology.LikeinHowey,theinvestorsarepassive.Marketingeffortsarerarelynarrowlytargetedtotokenusers.Andtypicallyattheoutset,thebusinessmodelandveryviabilityoftheapplicationisstilluncertain.Thepurchaserusuallyhasnochoicebuttorelyontheeffortsofthepromotertobuildthenetworkandmaketheenterpriseasuccess.Atthatstage,thepurchaseofatokenlooksalotlikeabetonthesuccessoftheenterpriseandnotthepurchaseofsomethingusedtoexchangeforgoodsorservicesonthenetwork.Asanaside,youmightask,giventhatthesetokensalesoftenlooklikesecuritiesofferings,whyarethepromoterschoosingtopackagetheinvestmentasacoinortokenoffering?Thisisanespeciallygoodquestionifthenetworkonwhichthetokenorcoinwillfunctionisnotyetoperational.Ithinktherecanbeanumberofreasons.Forawhile,somebelievedsuchlabelingmight,byitself,removethetransactionfromthesecuritieslaws.Ithinkpeoplenowrealizelabelinganinvestmentopportunityasacoinortokendoesnotachievethatresult.Second,thislabelingmighthavebeenusedtobringsomemarketing“sizzle”totheenterprise.Thatmightstillworktosomeextent,butthetrackrecordofICOsisstillbeingsortedoutandsomeofthatsizzlemaynowbemoreofapotentialwarningflareforinvestors.Somemaybeattractedtoablockchain-mediatedcrowdfundingprocess.Digitalassetscanrepresentanefficientwaytoreachaglobalaudiencewhereinitialpurchasershaveastakeinthesuccessofthenetworkandbecomepartofanetworkwheretheirparticipationaddsvaluebeyondtheirinvestmentcontributions.Thedigitalassetsarethenexchanged–forsome,tohelpfindthemarketpriceforthenewapplication;forothers,tospeculateontheventure.AsIwilldiscuss,whetheratransactioninacoinortokenonthesecondarymarketamountstoanofferorsaleofasecurityrequiresacarefulandfact-sensitivelegalanalysis.Ibelievesomeindustryparticipantsarebeginningtorealizethat,insomecircumstances,itmightbeeasiertostartablockchain-basedenterpriseinamoreconventionalway.Inotherwords,conducttheinitialfundingthrougharegisteredorexemptequityordebtofferingand,oncethenetworkisupandrunning,distributeorofferblockchain-basedtokensorcoinstoparticipantswhoneedthefunctionalitythenetworkandthedigitalassetsoffer.Thisallowsthetokensorcoinstobestructuredandofferedinawaywhereitisevidentthatpurchasersarenotmakinganinvestmentinthedevelopmentoftheenterprise.ReturningtotheICOsIamseeing,strictlyspeaking,thetoken–orcoinorwhateverthedigitalinformationpacketiscalled–allbyitselfisnotasecurity,justastheorangegrovesinHoweywerenot.Centraltodeterminingwhetherasecurityisbeingsoldishowitisbeingsoldandthereasonableexpectationsofpurchasers.Whensomeonebuysahousingunittolivein,itisprobablynotasecurity.Butundercertaincircumstances,thesameassetcanbeofferedandsoldinawaythatcausesinvestorstohaveareasonableexpectationofprofitsbasedontheeffortsofothers.Forexample,ifthehousingunitisofferedwithamanagementcontractorotherservices,itcanbeasecurity.Similarly,whenaCD,exemptfrombeingtreatedasasecurityunderSection3oftheSecuritiesAct,issoldasapartofaprogramorganizedbyabrokerwhooffersretailinvestorspromisesofliquidityandthepotentialtoprofitfromchangesininterestrates,theGaryPlasticcaseteachesusthattheinstrumentcanbepartofaninvestmentcontractthatisasecurity.Thesamereasoningappliestodigitalassets.Thedigitalassetitselfissimplycode.Butthewayitissold–aspartofaninvestment;tonon-users;bypromoterstodeveloptheenterprise–canbe,and,inthatcontext,mostoftenis,asecurity–becauseitevidencesaninvestmentcontract.Andregulatingthesetransactionsassecuritiestransactionsmakessense.TheimpetusoftheSecuritiesActistoremovetheinformationasymmetrybetweenpromotersandinvestors.Inapublicdistribution,theSecuritiesActprescribestheinformationinvestorsneedtomakeaninformedinvestmentdecision,andthepromoterisliableformaterialmisstatementsintheofferingmaterials.Theseareimportantsafeguards,andtheyareappropriateformostICOs.ThedisclosuresrequiredunderthefederalsecuritieslawsnicelycomplementtheHoweyinvestmentcontractelementabouttheeffortsofothers.Asaninvestor,thesuccessoftheenterprise–andtheabilitytorealizeaprofitontheinvestment–turnsontheeffortsofthethirdparty.Solearningmaterialinformationaboutthethirdparty–itsbackground,financing,plans,financialstakeandsoforth–isaprerequisitetomakinganinformedinvestmentdecision.Withoutaregulatoryframeworkthatpromotesdisclosureofwhatthethirdpartyaloneknowsofthesetopicsandtherisksassociatedwiththeventure,investorswillbeuninformedandareatrisk.Butthisalsopointsthewaytowhenadigitalassettransactionmaynolongerrepresentasecurityoffering.Ifthenetworkonwhichthetokenorcoinistofunctionissufficientlydecentralized–wherepurchaserswouldnolongerreasonablyexpectapersonorgrouptocarryoutessentialmanagerialorentrepreneurialefforts–theassetsmaynotrepresentaninvestmentcontract.Moreover,whentheeffortsofthethirdpartyarenolongerakeyfactorfordeterminingtheenterprise’ssuccess,materialinformationasymmetriesrecede.Asanetworkbecomestrulydecentralized,theabilitytoidentifyanissuerorpromotertomaketherequisitedisclosuresbecomesdifficult,andlessmeaningful.Andso,whenIlookatBitcointoday,Idonotseeacentralthirdpartywhoseeffortsareakeydeterminingfactorintheenterprise.ThenetworkonwhichBitcoinfunctionsisoperationalandappearstohavebeendecentralizedforsometime,perhapsfrominception.ApplyingthedisclosureregimeofthefederalsecuritieslawstotheofferandresaleofBitcoinwouldseemtoaddlittlevalue.AndputtingasidethefundraisingthataccompaniedthecreationofEther,basedonmyunderstandingofthepresentstateofEther,theEthereumnetworkanditsdecentralizedstructure,currentoffersandsalesofEtherarenotsecuritiestransactions.And,aswithBitcoin,applyingthedisclosureregimeofthefederalsecuritieslawstocurrenttransactionsinEtherwouldseemtoaddlittlevalue.Overtime,theremaybeothersufficientlydecentralizednetworksandsystemswhereregulatingthetokensorcoinsthatfunctiononthemassecuritiesmaynotberequired.Andofcoursetherewillcontinuetobesystemsthatrelyoncentralactorswhoseeffortsareakeytothesuccessoftheenterprise.Inthosecases,applicationofthesecuritieslawsprotectstheinvestorswhopurchasethetokensorcoins.Iwouldliketoemphasizethattheanalysisofwhethersomethingisasecurityisnotstaticanddoesnotstrictlyinheretotheinstrument.Evendigitalassetswithutilitythatfunctionsolelyasameansofexchangeinadecentralizednetworkcouldbepackagedandsoldasaninvestmentstrategythatcanbeasecurity.IfapromoterweretoplaceBitcoininafundortrustandsellinterests,itwouldcreateanewsecurity.Similarly,investmentcontractscanbemadeoutofvirtuallyanyasset(includingvirtualassets),providedtheinvestorisreasonablyexpectingprofitsfromthepromoter’sefforts.Letmeemphasizeanearlierpoint:simplylabelingadigitalasseta“utilitytoken”doesnotturntheassetintosomethingthatisnotasecurity.IrecognizethattheSupremeCourthasacknowledgedthatifsomeoneispurchasinganassetforconsumptiononly,itislikelynotasecurity.But,theeconomicsubstanceofthetransactionalwaysdeterminesthelegalanalysis,notthelabels.TheorangesinHoweyhadutility.Orinmyfavoriteexample,theCommissionwarnedinthelate1960saboutinvestmentcontractssoldintheformofwhiskywarehousereceipts.PromoterssoldthereceiptstoU.S.investorstofinancetheagingandblendingprocessesofScotchwhisky.Thewhiskywasreal–and,forsome,hadexquisiteutility.ButHoweywasnotsellingorangesandthewarehousereceiptspromoterswerenotsellingwhiskyforconsumption.Theyweresellinginvestments,andthepurchaserswereexpectingareturnfromthepromoters’efforts.Promotersandothermarketparticipantsneedtounderstandwhethertransactionsinaparticulardigitalassetinvolvethesaleofasecurity.Wearehappytohelppromotersandtheircounselworkthroughtheseissues.Westandpreparedtoprovidemoreformalinterpretiveorno-actionguidanceaboutthepropercharacterizationofadigitalassetinaproposeduse.Inaddition,werecognizethattherearenumerousimplicationsunderthefederalsecuritieslawsofaparticularassetbeingconsideredasecurity.Forexample,ourDivisionsofTradingandMarketsandInvestmentManagementarefocusedonsuchissuesasbroker-dealer,exchangeandfundregistration,aswellasmattersofmarketmanipulation,custodyandvaluation.Weunderstandthatmarketparticipantsareworkingtomaketheirservicescompliantwiththeexistingregulatoryframework,andwearehappytocontinueourengagementinthisprocess.Whataresomeofthefactorstoconsiderinassessingwhetheradigitalassetisofferedasaninvestmentcontractandisthusasecurity?Primarily,considerwhetherathirdparty–beitaperson,entityorcoordinatedgroupofactors–drivestheexpectationofareturn.Thatquestionwillalwaysdependontheparticularfactsandcircumstances,andthislistisillustrative,notexhaustive:Isthereapersonorgroupthathassponsoredorpromotedthecreationandsaleofthedigitalasset,theeffortsofwhomplayasignificantroleinthedevelopmentandmaintenanceoftheassetanditspotentialincreaseinvalue?Hasthispersonorgroupretainedastakeorotherinterestinthedigitalassetsuchthatitwouldbemotivatedtoexpendeffortstocauseanincreaseinvalueinthedigitalasset?Wouldpurchasersreasonablybelievesucheffortswillbeundertakenandmayresultinareturnontheirinvestmentinthedigitalasset?Hasthepromoterraisedanamountoffundsinexcessofwhatmaybeneededtoestablishafunctionalnetwork,and,ifso,hasitindicatedhowthosefundsmaybeusedtosupportthevalueofthetokensortoincreasethevalueoftheenterprise?Doesthepromotercontinuetoexpendfundsfromproceedsoroperationstoenhancethefunctionalityand/orvalueofthesystemwithinwhichthetokensoperate?Arepurchasers“investing,”thatisseekingareturn?Inthatregard,istheinstrumentmarketedandsoldtothegeneralpublicinsteadoftopotentialusersofthenetworkforapricethatreasonablycorrelateswiththemarketvalueofthegoodorserviceinthenetwork?DoesapplicationoftheSecuritiesActprotectionsmakesense?Isthereapersonorentityothersarerelyingonthatplaysakeyroleintheprofit-makingoftheenterprisesuchthatdisclosureoftheiractivitiesandplanswouldbeimportanttoinvestors?Doinformationalasymmetriesexistbetweenthepromotersandpotentialpurchasers/investorsinthedigitalasset?Dopersonsorentitiesotherthanthepromoterexercisegovernancerightsormeaningfulinfluence?Whilethesefactorsareimportantinanalyzingtheroleofanythirdparty,therearecontractualortechnicalwaystostructuredigitalassetssotheyfunctionmorelikeaconsumeritemandlesslikeasecurity.Again,wewouldlooktotheeconomicsubstanceofthetransaction,butpromotersandtheircounselsshouldconsiderthese,andother,possiblefeatures.ThislistisnotintendedtobeexhaustiveandbynomeansdoIbelieveeachandeveryoneofthesefactorsneedstobepresenttoestablishacasethatatokenisnotbeingofferedasasecurity.Thislistismeanttopromptthinkingbypromotersandtheircounsel,andstartthedialoguewiththestaff–itisnotmeanttobealistofallnecessaryfactorsinalegalanalysis.Istokencreationcommensuratewithmeetingtheneedsofusersor,rather,withfeedingspeculation?Areindependentactorssettingthepriceoristhepromotersupportingthesecondarymarketfortheassetorotherwiseinfluencingtrading?Isitclearthattheprimarymotivationforpurchasingthedigitalassetisforpersonaluseorconsumption,ascomparedtoinvestment?Havepurchasersmaderepresentationsastotheirconsumptive,asopposedtotheirinvestment,intent?Arethetokensavailableinincrementsthatcorrelatewithaconsumptiveversusinvestmentintent?Arethetokensdistributedinwaystomeetusers’needs?Forexample,canthetokensbeheldortransferredonlyinamountsthatcorrespondtoapurchaser’sexpecteduse?Aretherebuilt-inincentivesthatcompelusingthetokenspromptlyonthenetwork,suchashavingthetokensdegradeinvalueovertime,orcanthetokensbeheldforextendedperiodsforinvestment?Istheassetmarketedanddistributedtopotentialusersorthegeneralpublic?Aretheassetsdispersedacrossadiverseuserbaseorconcentratedinthehandsofafewthatcanexertinfluenceovertheapplication?Istheapplicationfullyfunctioningorinearlystagesofdevelopment?TheseareexcitinglegaltimesandIampleasedtobepartofaprocessthatcanhelppromotersofthisnewtechnologyandtheircounselnavigateandcomplywiththefederalsecuritieslaws.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissiondisclaimsresponsibilityforanyprivatepublicationorstatementofanySECemployeeorCommissioner.Thisspeechexpressestheauthor’sviewsanddoesnotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheCommission,theCommissionersorothermembersofthestaff.Section2(a)(1)oftheSecuritiesActof1933(SecuritiesAct)andSection3(a)(10)oftheSecuritiesExchangeActof1934(ExchangeAct)define“security.”Thesedefinitionscontain“slightlydifferentformulations”oftheterm“security,”buttheU.S.SupremeCourthas“treatedasessentiallyidenticalinmeaning.”SECv.Edwards,540U.S.389,393(2004).Iamusingtheterm“promoters”inabroad,genericsense.Theimportantfactorinthelegalanalysisisthatthereisapersonorcoordinatedgroup(including“anyunincorporatedorganization”see5U.S.C.§77n(a)(4))thatisworkingactivelytodeveloporguidethedevelopmentoftheinfrastructureofthenetwork.Thispersonorgroupcouldbefounders,sponsors,developersor“promoters”inthetraditionalsense.Thepresenceofpromotersinthiscontextisimportanttodistinguishfromthecircumstancewheremultiple,independentactorsworkonthenetworkbutnoindividualactor’sorcoordinatedgroupofactors’effortsareessentialeffortsthataffectthefailureorsuccessoftheenterprise.SECv.W.J.HoweyCo.,328U.S.293(1946).Dependingonthefeaturesofanygiveninstrumentandthesurroundingfacts,itmayalsoneedtobeevaluatedasapossiblesecurityunderthegeneraldefinitionofsecurity–seefootnote2–andthecaselawinterpretingit.Id.at298.UnitedHousingFound.,Inc.v.Forman,421U.S.837(1975).GuidelinesastotheApplicabilityoftheFederalSecuritiesLawstoOffersandSalesofCondominiumsorUnitsinaRealEstateDevelopment,SECRel.No.33-5347(Jan.4,1973).GaryPlasticPackagingCorp.v.MerrillLynch,Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.,756F.2d230(2dCir.1985).Secondarytradingindigitalassetsbyregulatedentitiesmayotherwiseimplicatethefederalsecuritieslaws,aswellastheCommodityExchangeAct.Inaddition,asSECChairmanJayClaytonhasstated,regulatedfinancialentitiesthatallowforpaymentincryptocurrencies,allowcustomerstopurchasecryptocurrenciesonmarginorotherwiseusecryptocurrenciestofacilitatesecuritiestransactionsshouldexercisecaution,includingensuringthattheircryptocurrencyactivitiesarenotunderminingtheiranti-moneylaunderingandknow-your-customerobligations.StatementonCryptocurrenciesandInitialCoinOfferings(Dec.11,2017).Inaddition,otherlawsandregulations,suchasIRSregulationsandstatemoneyservicinglaws,maybeimplicated.TheSupremeCourt’sinvestmentcontracttest“embodiesaflexibleratherthanastaticprinciple,onethatiscapableofadaptationtomeetthecountlessandvariableschemesdevisedbythosewhoseektheuseofthemoneyofothersonthepromiseofprofits.”Howey,328U.S.at299.“henamegiventoaninstrumentisnotdispositive.”Forman,421U.S.at850.Forman,421U.S.at853.Seefootnotes10and11.SECRel.No.33-5018(Nov.4,1969);InvestmentinInterestsinWhisky,SECRel.No.33-5451(Jan7,1974).Forexample,somehaveraisedquestionsabouttheofferingstructurecommonlyreferredtoasaSimpleAgreementforFutureTokens,or“SAFT.”Becausethelegalanalysismustfollowtheeconomicrealitiesoftheparticularfactsofanoffering,itmaynotbefruitfultodebateahypotheticalstructureintheabstractandnothingintheseremarksismeanttoopineonthelegalityorappropriatenessofaSAFT.Fromthediscussioninthisspeech,however,itisclearIbelieveatokenonceofferedinasecurityofferingcan,dependingonthecircumstances,laterbeofferedinanon-securitiestransaction.Iexpectthatsome,perhapsmany,maynot.IencourageanyonethathasquestionsonaparticularSAFTstructuretoconsultwithknowledgeablesecuritiescounselorthestaff.

加密貨幣行業領袖敦促國會在SEC對數字資產的打擊行動中采取行動:金色財經報道，隨著圍繞數字資產監管的爭論升溫，五位關鍵行業人物為國會記錄作證。Circle 首席執行官 Jeremy Allaire、前美國證券交易委員會律師 Coy Garrison、Ava Labs 首席執行官 Emin Gün Sirer、美國國家期貨協會首席執行官 Thomas Sexton 和 Prometheum 的證詞得到了證實。Circle 的聯合創始人、董事長兼首席執行官 Jeremy Allaire 和 Ava Labs 的創始人兼首席執行官 Emin Gün Sirer分別強調了數字貨幣和區塊鏈技術在積極社會基礎設施方面的潛力。

同時，Sirer強調了區塊鏈技術的變革潛力，將其影響與互聯網進行了比較，同時警告說，如果沒有明智的框架和合作，美國將面臨失去技術領先地位的風險。[2023/6/14 21:35:13]

美SEC拒絕BOX在以太坊上報告股票交易數據的請求:在周一由美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的通知中，該監管機構拒絕批準BOX Exchange Inc的旨在提供基于區塊鏈的股票交易報告的規則變更。該提案旨在讓國家市場系統（NMS）的股票使用BOX的區塊鏈交易場所，即波士頓證券型代幣交易所（BSTX）。BOX最初于2月28日提交了該提案，后來又添加了多項修改。據悉，該交易所是與tZero的合資企業，并于2018年開始參與基于區塊鏈的STO。(coindesk)[2020/12/29 15:56:53]

動態 | 區塊鏈技術公司Security Matters提交基于區塊鏈的植物跟蹤專利:以供應鏈為重點的區塊鏈技術公司Security Matters在美國提交一項專利申請，涉及用于種子和植物的標記、分類和識別的材料和方法。[2019/9/3]

動態 | 美國SEC再次推遲對VanEck比特幣ETF做出決定:據Ethereumworldnews報道，美國證券交易委員會(SEC)今日再次推遲了對VanEck和SolidX的比特幣ETF提案做出決定的時間。在周一上午發布的一份文件中，SEC透露，將行使其將裁決再推遲90天（至8月19日）的權利。該文件引用了諸如防止“欺詐、操縱行為和實踐”之類的擔憂來支持其決定，這些擔憂可能與最近的Tether和Bitfinex的糾紛案以及Bitstamp突然崩潰有關。美國SEC上周也對Bitwise的比特幣ETF提案發布了類似的判決。[2019/5/21]

動態 | 曾遭SEC罰款的加密項目放棄大麻合作空間計劃:據coindesk消息，美國證券交易委員會(SEC)此前批準的一個加密貨幣項目正在出售一處原本打算用作大麻聯合辦公場所的房產。ParagonCoin公司在上月底提交給美國證券交易委員會的一份文件中披露了這一消息。該公司表示，雖然它曾預計，大麻行業的初創企業可以使用其原生的PRG代幣支付共享辦公空間的租金，但該房產目前已簽訂了出售合同。去年11月，在該公司就2017年ICO相關指控達成和解后，SEC同意將這些代幣登記為證券。該公司在此次交易中籌集了1200萬美元，以“開發和實施其商業計劃，將區塊鏈技術加入大麻行業，并致力于大麻的合法化。”

然而，監管機構辯稱，這家初創企業應該將其代幣登記為證券發行，而不具備獲得注冊豁免的資格。因此，ParagonCoin被迫向投資者退款，并向SEC提交定期報告，并支付25萬美元罰款。[2019/4/23]

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